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I N T R 0 D U C T I O N.

In this examination of the law of imputed negligence, the writer has confined himself to the rlation of
"parent and child" and appeals only to th3 laws underlying
such relations and the state of th

law on this one subject.

Imputed negligence, especially from the parent to the infant
child, is a branch of th

law of contributory negligence which

sprung up, as it Were, with a startling suadenness and from
which there seems to have been no settled recovery in the
minds of the courts and the la-v writers.

Proclaimedas it

vas. by mere dictum, ana bound together only by fictions of
tht law, it easily hecame an object of assaultand a most
fruitful source of discussion.

WUhile applied and followed by

some high jul'isdictions, it is discouraged by other jurisdictions of equal prominence.

But the effect of the diversity

seems to be to lean towards a ccrtain goal and this will be
one of the important elements to make uo this paper.

Looking

first at the persons with whom the subject deals, we will then
attempt to apply those principles of law which have given us
cause to present this subject.
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I.

CH A P T E R

I.

(A)

Status of a Child !1on Sui Juis.

Opinions of Text 'Vriters.:-

Who are non sui juris has

been answered at length by all of the leading text writers on
the subject of contributory negligence.
ient age and capacity is

A person of suffic-

bound to use reasonable car- to pre-

vent injuries to others from his own acts o- injuries to himself from the acts of others.

What amounts to such reasonable

care, depends upon the circumstances in each particular case.
Lord Ellenborough,
puts it,

in Butterfield v.

"a person is

Forrest:r (II

East 60)

not to throwv himself upon an o!)struc-

tion and get damages or make it

the fault of another; and if

he doesn't us- common and ordinary caution to be in the right,
he can only have himself to blame.

One person being in fault

doesn't dispense with anothers using ordinary care with himself."

But a person non sui juris is not supposed to have
!I
the capacity of such a reasonable man and hence an exception
is made as to him,

and he is

not required to show the judgment

and discretion of more developed beings.
are of this class.

Infants may be said,

"Idiots and lunatics
in general,

to be-

long to this class also, but very evidently not all infants.
it

is

a question of capacity and has been found a difficult

question in many courts, besides a very fruitful source of con-

-3-

troversy as to what
sui

juris.

certain

age is

sufficient

to constitute

This is usually a question for th

cases where there can be no

It

is.
its

the court

(a)

The !7ev York Court

to

another to

years is

in

sui jur-

the care of

The custody of the in-

confided by the law in

its

parents,

or

those standing in loco parentis, and not having that discre-

tion

necessary

law to ex-rcise

for personal protection,
it

for him. "

by Mr. Beach, and he says,
not

Thom discretion

exclusively confided.

fant of tender

decides

"an infant in its first years is not

belongs to

person is

jury, but in

doubt,

as a matter of law to avoid danger.
of Appeals says,

an infant

sui

juris.

own name,

In

he is

sui

(b)

the parent

This statement

held in
is

denied

"it is not true that an infant is

the sense of maintaining
juris.

is

an action in

his

As far as his right of action is

concerned, he is in no respect the chattel of his father.

At

common law he was required to sue by a guardian appointed by
the

court.

The judgment
and it

is

go

they are at

if

recovered is

recovered

fo-

all

times subject to the court.

the sole property of the minor

his sole use."

(c).

Following

this

denial, the learned writer takes exception to the furthr con-

(a)
(b)
tc)

Beach on Con. Neg., Par. 117.
Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend, 615.
Beach on Con. Neg, Par. 128.
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tention that
"Agency is

the parent

is

the a6 ent of the child.

He says:

founded on contract either express or implied,

by

which one of the parties confides to the other the management
of some business to be transacted in

his nameon his account,

and by which the other assumes to do the business and render
an account of it."
gency.
him;

(a)

"Nor is the relation analogous to a-

He does not appoint him, he has no action against
every element of agency is

wanting."

child couldn't appoint an agent,
derived from the law.

The term

By common law the

so the power of the parent

is

"non sui juris" is almost

universally applied by the courts in speaking of very young
children who are incapable of using discretion, and we will
apply it in the same form here..

The law stands in a posi-

tion of parent to all minor children which may place a restriction on the acts of the real parents.

The health and welfare

of children may be protected and warrented by legal acts when
it is apparent that they are being subjected to injurious acts
a
on the part of their parents or guardians.
The law says parent

shall perform certain unspecified duties towards his child,

and such duties are not merely voluntary on the part of the
parent, but, on the contrary, have a compulsory process of the
law behind them.
(a)

7each on Con.

In return the child is duty bound to accept
Neg.,

Par.

129.
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the care and services of the parent and submit to his control.
But it is a relation distinct from any other relation between
parties known to the law.

There is no such unity in them

that the act of on- must necessarily cause co-operation in the
other.

Nor is there any contract relation between them; it is

simply a good parent and obedient son, bound together by those
mysterious e-F ties, parental love and affection.

"In ea 'ly in-

fancy and onward to a period not made definite by adjudications, but depending upon the particular case, with its circumstances and the intelligence of the individual child,
child is

,

Holding to

in

law,

the

incapable of contributory negligence. (a)

our rule that a perso,- must use reasonable care as

to himself and in what he does, it becomes neceIssary to ascertain when a child of tender years is to be held to the same
rules as adult persons or what is to he required of them before they reach that age.

We

,ill, then, consider as clearly

as possible what the holdings of the various courts justify
as a conclusion of car- in a child non sui juris and those in
parental relations to him.

(a)

Tishop on Non-contract

Lav, Par.

566.

-6-

II. WHAT IS REASONABLE CARE ?

(A) In an Infant Non Sui Juris:-

The question has been

much discussed whether a child non sui juris could b; held to
use reasonable care, or rather whether such a child can be
negligent at all so as to materially affect his cause of action for injuries caused by the negligence of another.

Surely

none of us could imagine a new horn babe being held responsible for any degree of care with a duty imposed upon it to use
such care under circumstances.
care is required.

There must be a tim

When does he reach the age

quired to use care ?

when no

ven he is re-

There is no certain time when we can

say that children of such an age must use so much care and
other children a-different degree of care.

1hat then 1would

be reasonable care in one, would not amount to reasonable care
in another.
c

Some children of a certain age know more and h~ve

greater mental capacity than other children of that age.

On the other hand, the care due an infant becomes greater as
his years are less.

The care due this class of persons is

greater than the la,-v exacts in dealing with any other class of
persons. (a)

"As to neglect or dereliction of the parent or

guardian being a reason why - child should be misused with impunity by third persons, it has been held that such wrong doing

(a)

causing injury is an offence of an aggravated nature.
Reach on Con.

Neg.,

Par.

124.

-7-

The most reasonable rule st,-Ms to be that a child is bound only to use such care as may reasonably b'3 exp ;cted fror, one of
his a-e and capacity under similar circumstances.

Th erefore,

we conclude that the younger the child, the less degree of
care is required of him, and at some age there is a vanishing
point where no care is required.
mine.

That age we cannot deter-

The courts have almost unanimously decided that the

above rule is the test, and each case depends upon th. circumstances surrounding it.

A most important cms

is that of

Lynch v. Wardin (a) where defendant's servant left a wagon on
the street with no one to guard it and the plaintiffwhile
playing around the wagon, -v s injured.

The court there held

that the child used only such care as one of his tender years
and discretion could be expected to use and that the defendant's agentby leaving the cart alone held out a temptation
to such childrenwhich he could not be heard to deny, nor excuse himself from injuries to those who haQ fallen into his
trap.

This has been followed by the United States courts

and most state courts.
ever ageis required to

Briefly stated, "th,: minor,of vThat>xercise the care,

vhich, under the

circumstances, is reasonably to b-e expected of one of his particular years and capacity,
( a ) 1 Q.

DB. i -/

a lack ,Ahereof is,

if

contributory

-0-

to the injury he complains of, the barring contributory negligence. " (a)

In analogy to

the- rule that under seven years

children cannot commit U crime,

some courts have held them also

incapable of negligence, but that
presumed.

!e conclusively

It has never found favo-- among many courts and is

not given any

veight.

The failure of the child to use great-

er capacity is no fault of the
no

is not to

child nor the parent,

and in

case, I think, will the bare act of a child of tender years

and capacity be considered negligence per se, but a question
for the jury.

(7) A Question for the Jury.
ingly young,

it

"Unless a child is exceed-

is usually left to the jury to determine the

measure of care required of'th

particular child in th!; ac-

tual

(b)

circumstances

of the case.

There would be no need

of sending the question to the jury as to the negligence
very small child, because not
reasonable men would differ.

of 'a

a matter of doubt or on which
Those cases where the parent

has permitted a small child to place itself in a position of
danger and it is injured through the fault of another, as a

(a) Bishop on Non-contract Law, Sec.
(b) Beach, Par. 117.

586.

-92-

rule, present complicated or uncertain facts, or evidence required to be

.eighed, or perhaps other reasons, which renders

it necessary to be sent to the jury.

(a)

After an ag,-and

un-

der circumstances not definable by rule, the court can see that
t1te infant is capable of contributory negligence and it
not

suffer the jury to ignore the fact.

(b)

where a boy nine years old w.as knocked do-Ri

vill

In a New York case,
by defendant's

street car, the defendants contended that the plaintiff's age
was inaterial and no excuse for negligence, and must
compliaoce on which his right of action rusts.
held "that it

show a

But the court

was a question for the jury and depended upon

the circumstances of the case.

The result of an act does not

n. cessarily condemn the act as rash or even negligent.
may have been an error of judgment and in such a case it

It
is

a

question for the jury to decide whether a person of ordinary
prudence and discretion might not,

under the circumstances,

have formed and acted upon the same judgment. "

"In each case,

the measure and degree of care, the omission of

rhich would

constitute negligence , is to be graduated by the age and capacity of the individual".

(c)

The most

sensible rule seems

to be not only to put the question of the child's reasonable

(a) Bishop on Non-contract Law, Sec. 580.
(b) Thurber v. Harlem Bridge, Morr isaina v. Forqcham R. h.
60 N. Y. , 326. (c)
Barry v. N. Y. Cent., 99 N. Y., 289.
Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt., 213.

Co.,

-10"

care to the jivy, but also
ent or person in

(C)

tion

that

the inevitable

the negligence

injury of the child is
for the jury,

gent,

their

(a)

re sult

not, per se,

in

an adult.

of judgment.

rection

Question

for

to be drawn from
thich contributes

but rather

a

is

the chila
It

(b)

gence per se to send a child of tenoer

ter

a

of the parent

',ic'ald br remote if

which would he negligence

This

is

Clues-

ana even though the parents were negli-

negligence

on an errand.

U par-

charge of an infant.

This is

the cases,
th

rmasonahle care in

The Reasonable Care of a Parent

the Jury.

to

-ihat is

is

"ut where the parent
child,

not:negli-

years out on the

a question for the jury,

an,; control of the

did no act

is

in

street

being a mat-

the immediate di,

his negligence may amount to

such as to he unnecessary to go to the jury.

If the child

exercised proper care and the defendant

agent

gent

and caused th,

regard to the

injury,

the defendant

question whethr'- it

if

then,

it

exist,-d,

liable

mere

Kuntz v.
Lynch v.

in

would be too remote.

-vant of care or personal

The City of Troy, 104 !.
Smith, 104 IMass,
53.

vas negliwithout

the parents

The negligence of the

the parents or attendant were not negligent

dant was,

(a)
(h)

if

is

was negligent

to let the child go out as they did.
parent

or his

Y.,

and the defen-

negligence

344.

But again

on the

-11-

part of the child would not,
case,

absolve the def>endant

unuer these circ-amstances

it

under the circumstances
from liahility.

(a)

of the

3ut

.ven

must not be lost sight of that

ianton or willful negligence alte-s the case materially.
Should the parent exhibit such wanton or willful misconduct as
to denote an intent to harm the child, it may absolve the defendant and throlv the consequences on the partent.
Having, perhaps, only lightly observed the position
of the infant in

law and the requirements as to his safety by

himself and his parents,

we may come to the principal subject

with which we have to deal,
tions in

a more definite

and observe their duties and rela-

form.

(a) Ihl v. The 42n& Street I Grand St. R. R. Co., 47 N. Y
Payne v. Th _ Tiumeston & Shenanckoah Ry. Co., 70 Ia. 548.
317.

-1
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THE DOCT1 INE WlF[I THE NEGTiIGENCE 0,2 THE PidWiNT IS

III.

(A)

Hartfield

when the

v.

Roper.

perhaps hetter

a.,e,

ting in

V.

out in

defendant

injuring it,

was decided,

of the

case,

in

a cut-

see the child and ran

for which injuries the child seeks to

recover on the grounds of the defendant's negligence. "
court held,

"that the plaintiff

the negligence of those
neglect.

It

was their

because
less,

a person in

in

the road and

charge of him amounted to criminal

the charge

of others,

child of such

who himself is

help-

cannot take advantage of and imposea penalty on defen-

stand it

himself,

of the one looking after

if' anybody,

and although it

harsh, small children are not freed from the leal
the law."

This boctrinc,

decision upon which it

(a)

The

negligence must be imputed to the child,

dant because of the neglect
must

was wrongfully in

duty to take charge of a

tender years and their

brief-

the road and was sit-

vas d'iving along

He did not

ter at a moderate gait.
over it,

(a)

kno.rn by the name of that case

"that a young child wnt
a snow pathand

Roper

The circumstances

than by any other name.

IMPUTED.

This doctrine was created

famous case of Hartfitld

, and is

(183)

ly,

o

21 Wendell,

615.

him.

He

may be
effects of

although unsupported 1y any other

was based,

has been followed in

several

-13-

other states to an uncertain extent,
attempt

to

Maryland,

enumerate,

are

among vhich,

Maine, California,

DTassachusetts,

and Kansas.
The harshness of the rule,
and it

many modifications,
any way extended.
the child itself

(a)

is

as an adult,

except,

has callud for

confined

.nct not in

The rule must only be appliedL where

has failed to use that degree of care which

part of the parent,
cover,

howvever,

nov,, st'ictly

would be required of an adult.
gligence,

without an

If

then no

has been free from ne-

amount of negligence on the

or guardian,

of course,

it

can effect the -ight to re-

as their acts,

quence of .:vents, might effect

in

breaking the se-

any other p ,rson.

The whole

theory of imputed negligence rests upon the assumption that the
child has acted in
has been of age.

a manner which would be negligence if

(b)

of this old rule,

and,

sire to avoid it.

(c)

let

in
It

fact,
is

a modification

the courts rather exhibit a de-

no longer per se negligent to

children o#erhaps six or seven years go on the street a-

lone.

Th- negligence of the parent o-

only wihen the guardian,

(a)
(b)
(c)

The New York rule now is

it

guardian,

by an act or omission,

peach, Par. 122.
Sherman and Redfield, Sec. 79.
1Mangan v. Th, Brooklyn City R. R.

in

is

imputted

the capacity

Co. , 36 Barb.,

230.

-14-

of tht guardian.

"The

an injured condition is
dian.

It

is

we may say,

fact that the chil,

has ben

not proof of neggligence

in

found in
the guar-

me-rely prima facib evidence of 1,vnt of care.
in most all

of these casu-s,

So

"the personal conduct

of the infant does not constitute the bar.

It may have an

"

important bea-'ing on the question of defendant's neglig nce,
but when the defendant

is

clearly negligent,

the contributory

pe-wnal negligence of the infant, obviously non su± juris,
cannot be alleged,

unless the negligence of the parent has

brought about the situation and in
injury:' (a)

In

McGove-n v.

some way contributed to the

Th: N.

Y.

C 1: H.

the New York courts went farther and said,

R.

R.

R.,

(b),

"that a child need

only use such care as a child of his age and capacity would be
likely to use under those circumstances, and was a question
for the jury. "

The case has been followed by the later case

of Kuntz v. The City of Troy (c),
Cross To-n R. R. Co.

(d).

and Huerzeller v. Th2 Central

A distinction was also made be-

+i

t.een the proximate and remote act of the parent,

and it

held that where a parent permitted a chilo to go out
young man of suitable age to care for it,

was

vith a

and the yoang man

(a) Ihl v. R. R. Co. , 47 N. Y., 317.
]'cGarry v. Loomis,
63 N. Y., 104.
(h) McGovern v. N. Y. C. c, E. R. R. R. , 67 jT. Y., 417.
(c) .104 N. Y., 344.
(d) 139 N. Y., 490.

et al.

was negli -ent, that th- act of the parent

ras too remote, but

that th, negligence of the young man -,uld b-, imputed to the
child directly and not to th, parent. (a)
Massachusetts has followed Ne

i

York closely in the

application of the doctrine, but there too, the strict rule
has been relaxed.

What

appears to be a most revolting appli-

cation of this rule was in
ill

a case :here a young girl

was made

by the escape of gas from the defendant's pipes. (b)

She

was in her own house and did nothing herself to bring about
the result.
she -vas.

The ga

enetrated and perva:ed the house where

The loophole of escape from liability afforded the

defendants was "that the father did not use proper precautions
to inform the defendants of the escaping of the gas when he
first discovere4t. "
gence as

Therefore, his omission was such negli-

vould b' imputed to her and prevent her recovery of
The groumds %forthis decision were that she was un-

damages.

der the care of he,

father, who has the custody of her person

and vas responsible for her safety.
over her,

It

was his duty to watch

guard her from danger and provide for her wellfare,

and it was hers to submit to his government and control.
(a) Metcalf v. Rochester Ry. Co.,
(b)

Holly v.

I A

n,

42 N. Y. Supp.,

The Boston Gas Light Co.,

431,

6 Gray,

620.

123.

eirg

-

entitled

to the benefits

be subject
of that
exert.

of his superintendence,

to any disadvantages

resulting

parental authority which
Apyone of ordinary care,

attributable
acting

ic-

to her in
for herself.

the

t

not easily

adult,

is

his

and t he plaintiff.

she doesn't

should afford her,

The

part,

±s

she were wholly

to

could conceive
such an injury
had been an

effect here

she is

times made ofi the rule

v.

Roper.

harsh rule is

which held that

it

The

doctrine in

show the application

of Hartfield

the

home

to be injured with impunity.

a modification of this
Reed (a)

that

a dangerous placjand,

by no means authority for the prevailing

of liunn v.

is

receive the protection which that

Massachusetts,but merely tends to

fact

on his

the plaintiff

defendant makes the home of the plaintiff

case is

anu duty to

court

negligence

Surely if

also

there would have been no connection betvhehn the action

of the parent

because

right

therefore,

How the honorabl

explained.

must

from the- exercise

same degree as if

of the proximity of the parent's
is

it

sh

What

showi in

is

somein

the case

-ias not rc-egligence

per se for a mother to permit a small child to play with a
strange

dog,

and that

from the circumstances

it

was a
what

question for the jury to decide

woild be reasonable

care in

the

plaintiff, taking into consideration his age and capacity.

(a) 4 Allen, 431.
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The parent's
if

it

negligence was also a

was found to

negligence a

jury,

but

contribute would he imputed to the child.

The present
sive elements

quustion for the

rule seems to

of the old one ancd,
question for the

drift

away from the

besides holding

jury,

(a)

it

repul-

the parent's

requires a

child to

use only such care as may r-asonably be expecte~d fror. one of
his

age and capacity under the same circumstances.

if

the parents were negligent,

if

the child has done no act which

adult.
is

So while we

(b)

with a

A strong

such negligence would be remote

see this

.vould be negligent
rule

followed in

tenaency to draw away and escape its
example of its

a anoa

And even

in

in

an

a way,

it

application.

Massachusetts, is

shown by com-

parison o. the holdings in Lynch v. Smith (c) and Plumley v.
Birge. (d)
Soma 3tates hav- gone so
ings to an entirely

opposite view,

gether the doctrine of Hartfield

(a)
(b)
(c)

57.

Illinois and Iowa.

change their

and have repudiated altoRoper.

Mulligan v. Curtis, 100 Mass. , 512.
Lynch v. Smith, 104 Mass, 53.
104 Mass.,
53.

(d) 124 Mass.,

(e)

v.

far as to

(e4

hold-

-

11
o-

IV. TiIE DOCTRINE AGAINST IMPUTING SUCH NEGLIGEHCE.

(A)

Generally.

oVermont has always repudiated the doc-

trine imputing negligence to a child and says the child is
only hound to use the care and prudence equal to his capacity.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania shows no toleration for the
doctrine and Nr Pampshire gives it a contemptuous kick and
says, "a man's property .ould be protected;
be under no less

so a child should

protection of the law than his chattel."(a)

The Vermont rule is stated clearly in Robinson v.
Cone,(b) which ease holds, that although a child is negligently
permitted by its parents to go

into the highway andwhile im-

properly there, is injured through the negligence of the defendant, he is not precluded fl'om his redress.

"Ifi

the defendant

knows that such a person is in the road, he is bound to a proportionate degree of watchfulness spection -

or, what

to the extent of circum-

.muld be reasonable care to a person whom

he supposed of full capacity would be gross negligence as to
a child or on? incapable of escaping danger'.

Both plaintiff

and defendant must use reasonable care and the negligence of
the defendant makes him liableiwhile the negligence of the
plaintiff bars his recovery; but the care of the plaintiff
(a) Beach on Cont. Neg., Par. 132.
(b) 22 Vt., 213.
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Judge Redfield

must be measured by his age and capacity.

"If the

compares the escaped animal to the child, as foilo,:-s:

animal had been injured whefthe d, fendant, i-y the usef ordinary care, could have avoided it, he is liable;
though the animal was improperly there.

and that even

A person is bound not

to use his own to do harm and if a person kno vs that
person is in the highway or on a railroad
proportionate degree of care.

such othE

, he is bound to

Ordinary care means that

a

de-

of care which may reasonably be expected of a person in

gree

plaintiff's condition and this would evidently be very small
indeed in so young

a

The (whole case~seems to base

child."

its decision on the age and capacity of the plaintiff, and
there is no

reason to doubt

the soundness of the decision.

In criticising the case of Hartfield v. Roper, the
court said:

"The case is old and a variance with Lynch v. Nur-

din (a) and far less sound in its principles and infininitely
less

satisfacory

tice.

"

to the

instinctive

The case of Lynch v.

sense of reason and jus-

Nurdin is

cited most favorably

by the cases holding this side of the question and is considered as tht English authority.
agent negligently left

In that

case the defendant's

a horse and cart on a

street

with1

one in charge of it while he went into a place nearby.

no
The

-20-

plaintiff
cart,
his

and some other children began playing
and :Thile plaintiff

friends

started

around the

was climbing upon the wheel,

the horse whereby

the plaintiff

to the ground and injured by the cart passing

one of

was thrown

over him.

It

held: "That the plaintiff

being a child could only be

to use the care that

his age and capacity 1vould warrant."

further,

"that even though the plaintiff

was

expected
And

was a trespasser,

yet the defendant was deemed to have anticipated such trespass.
It

was a temptation held out to young

play there which the defendant
The court

considered it

guished from willful

of malice:

Te

gross negligence and not much distin' The law runs the two

such a degree of negligence

into

some proof

This case is familarly cited in connection with

those cases where
railroaand

cannot be heard to deny."

negligence.

each other considering

children to come and

in

the infant plaintiff

the railroad

turn-table

is

a

trespasser

on a

cases.

The United Staes federal courts have settled to

the

rule that a child's care must be in proportion to his age and
capacity. (a)

But it

has been held that no negligence could

be imputed to a boy six yearsG1id, so
utory negigence did not

the question of contrib-

enter the cause.

(b)

Per-_haps the

(,a) McGuire v. Chicago, M.. 1' St. P. FEy. Co., 37 Fed. Rep.,
(b) C,,nt Trust Co. of N. Y. v. The Wabash, St. L. * P. Ry.
31 Fed. Rep., 246.

54.
Co.
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rule is most truly stated in
R.. (a)

Berry v. The Lake Erie & W. R.

Here the child was returning

from school and while

crossing defendant's

track ,.vas struck by an engine making a

flying

court

switch.

The

said:

"Many courts hold if the par-

ent sues for the injury of a child,
negligent, he cannot recover.

and the parent has been

Also if a parent

is in charge

and present at the time of the injury the parent's negligence
may be imputed to the child.

But I cannot

see why a parent's

negligence shoul-d be imputed when the parent

is not present

and the negligence of the defendant is the cause of the injury.
Property negligently placed on ones o'.,m premises so that

sparks

may come and burn it up the owner may nevertheless recover.
So if a parent negligently lets a child g ft hurt the child may
recover, notwithstanding the negligence of the parent.
Sureought
ly the law to regard human life and limb as well as his propeYrty.
parents

It

is said that the child is under the care of the

but the child has no

ch6ice in the matter.

The

child ought not to suffer irreparable inju-y without redress,
bec'ause the parent, from the want of care, has failed to protect it

from harm. 'It

seems a harsh, if not

a cruel, rule to

make it answerable in its maimd limbs or ruin-d health for
the negligence of its parent.

The parent's care ought to be

-22-

a shield to protect the child, but the want of it
be used as a sword to

injure or impair the

right

ought not to
of theinfant

to recover for injux-ries received through the negligence
another.

The act

of the parent

is

passive

and that

of

of the

wrong doer active and the injury would not have happened but
for the active wrong of the wong doer.

A wife with her hus-

band does not become negligent because her husband is and yet
she may r'ecover and a child cannot merely because he has no
choice in who shall guard him.

The modern text writers re-

pudiate the doctrine of imputed negligence in cases of infants
of such tender years and immature judgment as to be incapable
of exercising care for their

on safety."

The courts of Pennsylvania also repudiate the doctrinJ

of imputed negligence

ity to

foresee and avoid danger, negligence will not be imput-

ed to him. (a)
owes no

and if the infant has not the abil-

Thi

courts hold that the railroad company

duty to the trespasser and so not liable for injuries

received by a trespasserjthe right of the company being exclusive.

This bars both the action of a child, and of a parent,

because the parent owed a duty and the company did not
this holding is affirmed in a later case
(a) Rauch v. Lloyd and Hill,
nor, 48 Pa. St.,
2 Amerman, 414.
Noris, 308. (c)

I Pa. St.

(b);and

(c)

..
hich holds that

3i58.

Smith v. Q Con-

216. Phila. 7alt. - W.' R.R. Co., v. Layer,
(b) Cauley v. P. C. - St. i R.-. Co. , 14
3. '0.
Ry. v. Schwingling, 5 Outerbridge, 258
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If

which wqs violated by the defendant.

duty to the plaintiff
not then there is
is

respasser

of the

negligence there
It

is

is

for ,vanton or in.Yvther there was

The question is simply

tentional injury.
a

it L I A'ILE
comp:,ny~olly

the railroad

as to trespassers

The age or capacity

no legal liability.

snd there being no

evidently immaterial
no liability.

law;- that

held to be settled

when the parent

brings the action for the loss of services or expenses incurred because of the itijury to the child,
to

parttcontributing

the injury will

any negligence on his

bar his

action.

His
and in-

auty.toward the child becomes greater the more helpless
discreet the child is.

"If,

he cton-

by his owYn carelessness,

tributes to his own loss of the child's services he may be said
to be in

pari

delicto with the negligent

negligence of the parent

however

is

a

Any number of cases hold that
parent

defendant.

(a)

The

question for the jury.
the

negligence of the

will not be imputed to bar an action by the child and

it is not doubted as a rule in this state.

(b)

Although the courts in Illinois have seemingly heretofore imputed the negligence of the parent
gree it

may now be considered as settled

to a limited de-

that the negligence

of the parent is not to be imputed to the child.
(a) Glassey v.
Tiestonville, 1,antua , Fairmount Ry.
Smith, 172.
(b) E'ie
City Pas,. RyA Co. v. Schuster, 3 Arperman,

The court
Co.,
412.

in
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the case of The Chicage City Ry.
of this

and says,

Co.

V.

Wilcox

speLaks

,t t. seems to he assumed by several of the

writers on the subject that this court is
trine that in

(a)

comitted to the doc-

a suit by a child to recover damages,

the negligence of the plaintiff's
imputed to the plaintiff
utory negligeJnce.

in

parents

caused by

and custodians may be

support of the defence of contrib-

While there is,

foundation for this assumption,

in

some of the cases,

yet in

some

our opinion the questiol

has never been so considered or d-,atermined by this court as
to make it
given:
in

the settled rule of this state.1"

Thie rule is

then

"That the negligence of the parednt or others standing

loco parentis cannot be imputed to him so as to support a

defence of contributory negligence in

a suit for damages."

The cases are divided into two classes by the learned judge, being first, where it is decided as a matter of law
up to a certain age,

the precise limit of

not be well defined,

a child is

-ihich is

not and can-

incapable of such conduct as

will constitute contributory negligence.

The other class is

"that young children are bound to use only such care as may
reasonably be expected of children of the same age and degree
of intelligence and it

is

always,

for the jury to decide from all
(a)

138 Ill.,

7Q.

therefore,

a question of fact

the circumstances of the par-

City of Pekin v.

Mc?1Jahon,

1F4 Ill.,

141.
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ticular case'
able

extent,

"Doubtless a child may possess, to a corsiderwhat may be termed instinct

tion and.n consequence b
for his o-n
only in
his

safety;

capable of using considerable care

but when moved by that instinct, he acts

view of what he sees or what

s,-,nses.

preserva-

of self

is

actually present

To guard against unforeseen

danger,

or

to

that whida

has not come waithin the sphere of his observation, and requires an exercise of reason and reflection,
child is

seldom capable,

on humane principles,

vhich so young a

and for which the law,

a:iministered

will scarcely hold him responsible."

Th-e above opinion is
sound discussions in
in

of

one of the

su1 port of this

most admirable and

doctrine that

any of the numerous cases oi- text books and is
PI l

I have fourr.
a good state-

ment of the doctrine in question.
New Jersey forcibly scores the doctrine imputing negligence to the child and follows Pennsylvania and other stat
repudiating Hartfield

v.

Roper.

The most sweeping

changes

in

courts have been made by the courts in
held that

the parents negligence

but in Wmore v.
of a

the holdings of the
Iowa.

was imputed to the

Mahaska County (a)

child,

where the administrator

child two years old sues, the old doctrine

(a) 78 Iowa, 396.

The ea:'ly cases

was entirely
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broken dovm.

The court

said:

"Although the- parent's neglig-

ence may bar an action by themselves,
by the child.

it

cannot bar an action

The child cannot be negligent and it

authorize another to be such; therefore,

it

is

cannot

unreasonable

to make him liable for the negligence of thepa-,'ent. "

And it

was further held that there was no ground for distinction between cases Where the parent has the child under his immediate
control and wher,: theL parent.is absent.

As the administrator

was seeking to recover' for the child and not the parent he was
entitled to recover.

(B) As Criticising Ilartfield v. Roper.

The criticisms

of Hartfield v. Roper are many and uniformly severe.
Beach

,

Mr.

in his book on Contributory Negligence (a), argues

very strongly against any soundness in the principle.
nies in the first place,

He de-

"that the infant is not sui juris for

the purpose of maintaining an action of his own.

Nor is

therex

relation of ptincipal and agent or any analogous relation: evey element of agency is wanting.

By common law the child

could not appoint ;-n agent so the parOnt gets his authority
from the law:

'The parent's authority is given for the pro-

tection of the child, but the rule of Hartfield v. Roper turns
the shield into the sword and uses it

(a) Beach on Con. Neg,

Sec.

128-12.

to deprive the child of

27

"The

the very protection arising. from the parental relation."
doctrine being bsed

upon authority,

reasoning by which it

can

must be judged by the

.e supported.

That

are varying

founded upon the false assumption that there
grees of negligence
that

the

and corresponding

reasoning

is
de-

degrees of liability;
but to the parent;

judgment belongs not to th., child,

tha

that there is no duty upon the court to protect the child;

the parent is the child's agent, and that the child has an adsuch negligence is

equate remedy against his parent, and that
contributory negligencil
And the courts in Pennsylvania

(a) say,"it is repul-

sive to our natural instincts and repugnant

to the condition

of that class of persons who have to maintain life by daily
toil,

introducing incidentally to poor parent
It

forcibly criticized in N .7 Jersey in the

is most

case of Newman v. The Philiipsburgh
where the court

doctrine.

says:

Horse Car R. R. Co.,

"I can't see ho.v in

(2

llartfield v. Roper

the custody of the infant leads to or justifies the imputation
of another fault
child in

the care

in

him.

of adult,

The law,

natural

but how ran this

put the

and civil,
right

(a) Kays v. The Pa. R. R. Co., 6F Pa. St., 269.
Phi la c Reading R. R. Co. v. Lo.g, 7! Pa. St.,
(h) 52 N. J. ,., 146.
Bi shop on Non-contract Tia'v, S:c., 5 2.

to care

257.

for
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to ',aive or" forfeit

uim be construed into a right
legal

rights

of the infant

?

any of the

The capacity to make such waiv-

er or forfeiture is not a necessary or even convenient
dent

to this affice

inconsistent

-ith

of the adult, but on th_
it,

contrary is quite

for the power to protect

to the power' to harm hy act or omission.

inci-

is

Tht rule

the opposite
in'Wendell-

the

must be dn the theory of the custodian of the infant being
gent of the infant;
basis,

but it

is

for such custodian is

mere assumption
the agent,

A mother could not contract

of a railroad

company for injuries
negligence -

bonus mores,

and second,

putability

of negligence

and,

21 Wendell,

agency is

away the

;'ut

liability

to her babe causea by the

first, because the contract is contra
because the mpother

of the child authorized to

until

legal

not of the infant,

of the law.

rail-vad's

vithout

a-

not th:

agent
The im -

znter into the agreement.

is

a mert- pure interpolation

rnot

wasiknown of in

supposed to be a

is

the law.

of law,
The law of

voluntary act of th-1 principle,

and

not have his

agents forced upon him.

The conversion of an in-

fant,

entirely

into a wrong doer,

who

is

imputation,
the spirit

is

,oily

free from fault,
a logical

of jurisprudence.

ccntrivance
The sensible

child of tender years can't be negligent,

by

incongenial

*ith

6-octrine

that

nor h-ve it

is

imputed

a
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to him;

for he is

incapable of a-,pointing

quence being that he can
!hl':r,able
injury.

cause,
It

either

would make

for the negligence
the negligence

in

in

an infant

o C the nuirse.

of the nurse,

Cent,

thr: conse-

way be considerecd to be the

the whole or in

infant and he would be liable
no

no

an

part

in

the nurse's

If

persons

, of his

oxn

arms liable
are injured by

they have an action against the
for neglects

such doctrine has ever prevailed.

of his parents.

But
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V.

SPECIAL

Having

DOCTRINES INTRODUCED.

discussed in

a general

way,

th,

holdings of

the courts en both sides of tlhe question of imputing negligenc;
ial

of the parents

doct'ines

it

is

probably -a.ll to observe the spec-

intro *uctu which may have materially

influenced

the decisions in these cases.

(A) Effect of Presence of the Parent at th

Injury.

This

is a turning point upon which the cayuse of an injured child
may rest.

The effect is that if the partnt is present

at the

injury or has the child under his immediate control or direction, the parent's negligence' will be imputed to the child and
if the parent is not present,

no negligence will be imputed.

The parent has a certain duty to perform towards the child and
the child is duty bound to
and control.

submit to the pa~ient "s- government

The child would be entitled to

any advantages a-

rising from the -'elations, and so is subject to any disadvantages resultinr.

from the exercise of that parental authority.

If not present, then the child is only to use the care to be
expected from one of his age and capacity. (a)

(a) Stillson and Hannibal v. St.

If the parent

Joseph R. R. Co. , 67 Mo. , 671.
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is

not present,

and has not been negligent

the child to go out

if

Ulon,

child is

as to pe-initting

.ould not b; the proximate cause and

parent

An example of such a case

to an action.

parent has put the child in
petent to care for him,
of the custodian.
connected.

iii

be no defence

voula be where the

of a person reasonably com-

cha--'w

and injury results from some negligence

Here the parent's act was not proximately

The presence of the parent is

plication of the rule in
applied even unde'

acts of the

injurc;d, the

Ha-tfield v.

merely a limited ap-

Roper,

and should not be

such an exceptional circumstance.

see no distinction between the cases where the parent

I can
is

pre-

sent and has the child under his immediate control and where
he is

absent.

The authority of the parent

upon the proximity of the child.
to be imputed,
as much

(B)

If

the negligence were

the relation of iparent and child would exist

7hen separated as when th y are together.

Comparative Degrees of Negligence.

applied in negligence
dictions,

(a)

(a)

does not depend

'.ymore

cases in

Illinois

This rule was

and some other juris-

but never has attained popular favor.

v.

Mahacka County,

76 Io'va,

3§a.

7y it,

one
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who

is

less,

guilty

of any

slight

negligence may rec(ver,

nevurtheeven thougih-

df a person who has been grossly negligent,

the negligence of both concur in

point of time and place with

that of the other.

followea in

a Tnart
ally

(a)

of th.,c Code of that

say that

it

exzrcising

state.

.But

the

would be useless to state

parative ne,-ligence

parative

This is

a.

courts now generthe

applicable to a plaintiff

ordinary care for personal

degrees,

Georgia and forms

extraordinary,

incapable of

security-

ordinary,

doctrine of com-

(b)

T'.e com-

and slight

can'not

be fitly applied to children in reference to measures to be
observed by them for their

(C)

Poor Parent

in

life

to

consider

we-ighing

Doctrine.

held by the parents
in

own security.

is

By this doctrine the position
made a circumstance

on Contributory Negligence

sistance in

in

for the jury

connection with the other circumstances

the care use,; by the parent.

"Most people

(c)

large cities

taking

(d)

Hr. Beach, in his work

commends the :'octrine and says:

are poor and unable to

care of their

in

children.

ents have to work f-om home to procure food.

employ as-

Often both parChildren crowd-

Toledo \Vab.
- .Ast. '..
R. Co. v. Grable,
8 Ill.,
441.
(#) Georgia Code, Sec. 2072.
116 Ili.!-7
(b
Chicago St. I.' c Pittsburgh R. R. Co. v. Welshl,
(Ga.), c12.
(c) Western & A. R. R. Co. v. Young, 7 S. E. Rep.
(d) Beach on Con.
Teg.,
Sec. 135.
(a)
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hayw. air, and there is no re-

ed in ill aired t:cnements must
sort I-ut the streets.
it

If one is injured in its

Joes not follow that

helplessness,

it or its parents were negligent.

When it is all an accident,

it is to be pitied; but when it

is injured through the negligence of ..
nother, then it should
be permitted to bring an action the same as anyone else and
its poverty taken into

consideration.

The poverty and desti-

tution of the parent is not a license for the child to act
Vecklessly, yet

it should not be a license

negligently towards it,
to be considered."

for others to act

but rather, should be a circumstance

Poor parents can't

keep

their

eyes~n

their children all of the time.
The question seems to be whether the parent used the
care for the child's safety as ordinary prudent persons in his
situatioH

deem proper an.

sufficient

under

like circumstances$%)

Illinois has adopted with favor this doctrine and
says the same rule
upon their

should not be appliea to persons depending

labor for support

and to those

vhose means

enable

the mother of the family to give a constant personal attention
to the care of the children,

(a)

Frick v.

Th

St.

T.,

Kas.,

or employ a nurse for that

?.Northern Ry.

Co.,

pux-

75 Mo.,

542.
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pose.

(a)

This is

other states.

similarly adopted in Pennsylvania

Its increasing popularity is

(b),

and

vinced by the

manner in whic> it is being taken up and I think rightly, because the law as a rule of civil conduct,
positions to effect all

its

subjects.

(D) Parent's Negligenc
necessary in

should apply to all

the Proximate Cause.

some jurisdictions,

that in

oraeo to be a defence

the par ;nt's negligence must. be proximate,
be imputed to the

c hild.

It

is

It is held

and it

-ill

then

a fundamental rule of thj

law of cont-ibutory negligence that a person is

I iable for

only such damages as his negligent acts are the proximate
cause of,

and plaintiff's

it, is a defence.
in

_ parent

is

negligent

a question to be d-cided !-y the rule of each
The negligence of the parent is

some courts,

and so a defence,

ority of the cases the partnt's
the jury.

Others make it

present at the injury,
which is

:ihich contributed to

But what amounts to such proximate cause

particular jurisdiction.
held'pe-' se in

act

negligence

a good defencu if

and that it

Alton R.

Chicago !

(!n)

Phila. c Readi-rw

R.

R.

R.

the rm]aj-

a question for
the parent

-as

must be' a proximate cause,

also to be decided by the jury.

(a)

is

but in

It is not enough
, 226.
5 Ill.
75 Pa. St., 257.

Co.,

v.

Gregory,

Co.

v.

Long,
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that

somebody's child

vas injured,

which

gence on the part of defenu-nt
of the injury.
cause,
joint

the parents'

If

then defendant's

but there must be neglivas the proximate cause

negligence

evidently was not,

was the proximate
unless they were

wrong~doers.
The California courts lay the error of the Nev York

court,

in

Hartfield v.'Roper,

to the fact"that

they ignore

all distinctions between cases where the plaintiff's negligence 1.as the proximate cause and where

it

was remote",

and

in not limiting the rule which they announce,to the foo'mer.
A remote fault

in

care on the part

once person,
of another,

lowever,

but may in

(a)

does not dispense with
fact make it

more nec-

essary to avoid calamitous injury or to mitigate an unavoidable calamity.

The application ofT the rule as to proximate

cause here is the same as in the case of an adult, but it is
a

proximate

as to what will be considered

vhich varies greatly

question

cause in

the child

dictions where negligence is

or his parent.
not

imputed,

In other juris-

the parent's

negli-

gence bars his recovery, and then it must be proximate under
a general rule

( a)

Meeks v.

of law.

The S.

Pac.

R.

R.

Co.,

76 Cal.

513.
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(E) Introduction of the Doctrine of Davies v. Mann. (a)
This doctrine has been cited frequently to

dishrove the doc-

trine imputing negligence of parent to the child and makes a
strong negative argument.

Under Davies v. Mann, the aefen-

dant is liable for negligence to plaintiff's animal if)by the
use of ordinary care,he might have avoided the injury, after
knowing thit plaintiff had been negligent in leaving it where
it

vas.

The ruling created a change in the whole law of con-

tributory negligence.
argued that

an infant of such tender years,as to be incapable

of exercising care

, is not less under the protection of the

law th-xn a chattel.
is

In applying it to these cases, it is

immaterial

"The previous negligence of the parents

and the only question for the

the defendant,
ed the injury.

jury is whether

by the use of ordinary care, could have avoidIf she could notshe is without fault and is

not liable, but if she could she is liable whether plaintiff
was in the street by reason of, or without his parent's negligence. (b)

And this is so

even as to a trespasser or one

wrongfully on the road or highway.

There is as a rule, no, or

a very small, duty due a trespasser; but when the defendant

(a) 10 M. & W. ,

545.

(b) ?isaillon v. Blood, 64 N. H. , 565. h.obinson v. Cone, 122
Vt., 213. Jamison v. Ill. Cent. R.". Co., 63 Miss., 3j.
D. & P. R. R. Co. v. O'Connell, 56 Tex., 27. ' alt. City Pus.
Co. v. I'cDonnell, 43 Md., 534..
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discovers him,

he is

hound not to wantonly

must use care to avoid the injury.
to use his
others.
ited

o ,rn with such reasonable

is

care

so

is

cs not to

bound
injure

and property that

the wonder

not oftener applied to the cases of children.

a child entitled to

'(a)

A person

but

This rule hs been so favorably received in the Un-

States as regards aaults

why it

(a)

injure him,

The KAs.

Pac.

as much care as a drunken man ?

Ry.

Co.

v.

li"i le,

39 Kas.

531.

Is

is
not

I think

-'5

C 11A P T E R

I.

next

upon faet,
h,

friend.

The action is
is

a fair rule.

No

upon the plaintiff

a verdict.

in

all

parent's negligence is not

incapable of being negligent,

tiff

had only to show the status

of the defendant,

puted,
his

to

it

would seem that the plain-

of himself and the negligence

the child is

But outside of those
negligent

so as to bar

So in cases wheri parents negligence is not im-

but the child must nevertheless use care according

age and capacity,

negligent.
used.

In some states, where the

confirrm his suit.

may happen that

because of the

imputed and the child non sui juris

is

his action.

shoi that

This, t i- court thinks,

the states,

varied opinion among the courts.

it

to

entirely

fixed rules of liability of defendant

can be .offered as generCl

states,

based almost

juris, and by such evidence as will, when con-

sidered by the jury, merit
is but

.

are generally brought by the infant

and the burden

is not sui

I

INFANTS SUIT FOR DAMAGES.

These suits
through his

I

In

if

he doesn't

use that care,

So it must there be shown that
those states

where the parent's

puted, there must usually b'_

to

he must be

such care was

negligence

is

im-

a concurring act on the part of

- K,-

thf

child

which ,-ould be negligence

in

an adult.

If

the

child uses proper care, he may recover notwithstanaing the
want
mot .

of care

in

tht

parent,

Evidencu to

because that

substantiate these must be given in
e

case according to

jurisdiction.

wanton or willful

negligence,

withstanding

"lould then be too re-

if

A dfendant
shown,

the negligence of the

who

is

guilty

will be liable,

infant

or his

parent..

-ach
of
not-

-

II.

40-

PARENT'S SUIT FOR DAMAGIS.

Besides the suit for damages by the infant,

the par-

ent may also have a cause for loss of Services of the child
and for incidental expenses to the injury such as doctors'
bills, and the like.

As a rule he may recover such, but ac-

cording to the rule in most states he cannot recover if
been negligent so as to contribute in any way.

he has

This applies

the
in

states whereAparent's negligence is

and in states .where it
recover.

is

not,

imputed to the child,

and the child is permitted to

Pennsylvania holds this way,

and although no negli-

gence can be imputed to the child and he may recover; yet if
the parent is

negligent he cannot recover damages.

(a)

The

i'ight of the parent to recover when he has been negligent,
they say, would permit him to recover damages for his orn wrong.
(b)
In most all cases the question here is for the Jury to decide,

although some Jurisuictions make ce-tain acts towarcds children
negligence per se

The beneficiaries may gFt pecuniary dam-

ages for the death of the child and in a majority
cases the negligence of the beneficiary wil

of the

not bar his

(a) Erie City Pas. Ry. Co., v. Schuster, 3 Ammerman (Pa), 4.
City of Pekin v. 1Mciahon, 154 Iii.
, 141. Cam')erger v. Cit.
St. Ry. Co., 95 Tenn., I".
Berry v. Lake Eri-J & W. R. R. Co.
7, Fed. Rep., 679.
(b) 7F Yo., F 2. 'Tick v. St. r/, Kas, City
&-N. Ry. Co.. Pitts.,
Aile. - V. K y: v. Pearson , 2.> Smith, 16'
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recovery as beneficiary because thce action

>enefit and not the parunts.
the negligent parent
TGach says:

"That

circumstances

But an exception *ould be where

iould I e the only beneficiary.

a parent

can only recover

of prudence as

feated by the negligence
derives his

So a parent's

person.

might recover notwithstanding
part

of the child,

reason,

is

a

"

because where

a

.ction from an injury done to

a third person, such person is justly chargable
gligence of the third

the action

action maybe de-

of the injured child,

cause of

Mr.

under the same

vould be required if

were on behalf of the child.

plaintiff

Is for thu child's

(a)

with the ne-

%ITo say that the parent

the degree of negligence

statement which has no

and would be disasterous to commercial

on the

foundation in
life.'

(b)

The

rule askto parents' actions is little varied in the different
states.

(a) "each on Cont. Neg. , Sc. 132.
(b) Manly v. Th Wilmington (I- Welden R. R. Co.,

74 I. C.,

6 *5.
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,.

Having gone over the numerous findings+f lay' in general,

it

now necessitates a solition of the queries presented

to us and a general summary of what prevails.
The general idea of a child non sui juris as infrred from the cases, is such a child as is incapable of caring
for himself in

a proper manner.

The term is

applied, perhaps,

without discretion, but it has become a general term in the
law.

To be considered non sui juris, it is not necessary to

be an infant,

hut any person who is

upon examination,

an idiot or insane may,

be found non sui juris.

As applicable to

a child, it is only because of the child's inability and want
of judgment and capacity to use p-oper care.

The want of such

care gave rise to this doctrine in the law of contributory negligence.

It is generally taken

for granted that a small

child cannot use the care of an adult nor can the same rules
of contributory negligence be applied to him,

and this

perhaps the one excerption, in Ohio, is settled.

, with

The doctrine

of Ffartfield v. Roper admitted this when the doctrine of imputed negligence was instituted,
immaterial,

but there it

as the negligent act of the parent

was considered
was what
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constituted

th,,? bar to

the infant's

by the negligence of defene.4ant.
have done some act
dult.

(No

in

act

though the child of itself
gligent

1)y this

-nd sit

of the parent

such a dangerous position

fiction

for injury caused

Even there the child must

which 1'xuld amount

adult would go out

The negligent

action

in

to negligence
in

permitting

could do no wrong,
Its

an a-

a traveled road. )
thE child to get

ias a co-existing

of law.

in

principles

element.
it

Al-

was made nehave been de-

nied on all sides and, even in those states where it owed its
creation,

it

hes been avoided to

and Massachusetts now say that

it

a

certain extent.
is

a question for the

to be decided fror, the circumstances of the case,
The contrary

impute the neglignce.

hold as a matter of law that

New York
jury,

but still

cases -,,ere inclined to

such small children as to be non

sui juris could not b,. guilty of negligence, nor could they be
charged with it
g-ating his
to him to

through another.

A person incapable

negligence was held incapable of having
satisfy

a

Mann was cited and is

an effective weapon in

destroying the old doctrine.

should a

negligently placed in

tion,

who

imputed

fiction.

The doctrine of Davies v.

child,

it

of dele-

is

now

Why

a dangerous posi-

be denied the protection of the law that is

afforded
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his

parent's

horse or other chattel;

an adult person lying

in

a

state

or when,

in

the case of

of intoxication in

tL- road,

the defendant is bound to use all reasonable care to prevent
any injury to him,

not -ith-standing

him to be there.

And in such a case it

th

defendant

the negligence

is not necessary that

shall see the object, but if h-1 might have seen

it if he had s-een proper care, he is liable.
of a

child,

which cause

who

is

incapable

But in the case

of helping himself, he is

to be

an object of willful or reckless injury without a redress, simply because he is not afforded the proper care and protection
due him from those nearest

to him.

This, they attempt. to circumvent by claiming him a
trespasser
too,

in

to

hom the defendant oved no diligence;

cases which show on their
It

hind them.

is

face the infirm support be-

safe to say that

the majority of the states

repudiate the doctrine imputing negligence
liability,-a
stances.

and this,

and make defendant's

matter for the jury to decide under the ci',cumNo

age can be said to be a

the child shall

be incapable

after which an ordinary
though in analogy to
cannot be guilty

of a

of all

time certain under which
negligence or care,

and

amount of care can be required, al-

th- rule of criminal law that a chila
crime who

is

under seven years of age,
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some courts have attempted to apply such a rule as to infant's
negligence..

Children of all

ages up to seven years have

been held non sui juris and incapable of using care, but it is
not possible to definitely determine just when they become capa 1 e.
A distinction is made between cases wheru the parent
is

present at the injury and where he is

sent,
not if

i'

not.

has been 1.,hAd that his negligence
he is

absent.

This is

If he is pre-

vill be imputed,

b4t

on the ground of ekercising im-

mediate control of the infant's movements, ancQ the infant is
bound to

subject itself

to his government and care.

Bing en-

titled to ,any benefits resulting from the relation, he is also
liable to Lziy disadvantages arising from it.

But sensibly,

I can see no reason why such position of the parent should be
material.

His parental authority is not dependant upon immed-

iate presence,

but exists as forcibly when at work in his of-

fice as when at home in the presence of his family.
Probably no doctrine has been so warmly received as
the doctrine which takes the par2nt's postion in life into consideration in determining th: negligence of such parent.
poor have to

work for a living and

The

O not have a chance to

keep a close watch over the shildren around them.

Such chil-

-46-

dron are liable to escape from them4 at some time,

even though

great

Nurses "-re

care

is used by the parent to prevent it.

a luxury not enjoyed by children of poor peoiplLand

hetnlthe

children go out to get the much needed air and exercise, it
is

'ith

the most available person.

person,

This sometimws is

a young

but such young children are often possessed of unusual

discretion.

Their situation in

life

educateslhem in many

ways that become much older people.

The children shoula not

be denied fresh air because there is

no one to take them out,

and it

should be a question determinable under such circum-

stances.
it

is

I

think that

the doctrine i.s admirable in

to be applied without discrimination)but a fault may a-

rise in

that

rigid.

It

it

will discriminate between classes by being too

should be',an elastic rule,

applicable to

ple in thei- particular situation in life.
this
is

has not been accepted by any means in

all

peo-

And although
a (;eneral way,

it

a rule bound to find favor.
The question,

in

so far as

all

therefore,

cases to determine what

and the child.

should be put to the jury

is negligence

in

the parent

The most general rule and the almost

auniver-

sal one is that a child should be required to use the care
which may reasonably be expected fron one of his age and cap-
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acity under the particular circumstances.

This is fair.

It

says that a small child must only use what may reasonably bexpect d , and is considerate enough to infer that that is not
much;

hut as his age increases, so

,'oes his care.

This is so

even in the cases which impute the parent's negligence.

If

the child uses such cre, it is not negligent; and if it is
not negligent, and the defendant is, the child may recover
What becomes of the parent's negligence then ?
say that

I should

it -Vas only remote because the absence of want of

care in the child showqthat all the care under the circumstances was used and tha-t alone ]vill deny any contributory negligence to
gent in

defeat the action.
letting the child get

But if the parent is net negliaway,

withstanding the parent's care,

4aa the child escapes not-

and is

the universal rule, I think that it

injured ?

Then, under

all lies with the plain-

Chat

tiff.

If he has used the care ,=fAa child of his age and ca-

pacity vould ordinarily use, the defendant is liahle; but if
he has not used that care, he is guilty of contributory negligence, notwithstanding his age.

This, we see, dispels the

idea of putting an age under which a child is non sui juris
in fact ana law.

The rule is self operating.

If he is young,

the rule is the same, hut it shows that, even then, a small a-

